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Completed papers:
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Liquidity-Saving Mechanisms in
Collateral-Based RTGS Payment Systems
Abstract
This paper studies banks’ incentives for choosing the timing of
their payment submissions in a collateral-based real-time gross
settlement payment system and the way in which these incentives
change with the introduction of a liquidity-saving
mechanism (LSM). We show that an LSM
allows banks to economize on collateral while also providing
incentives to submit payments earlier. The reason is that, in our
model, an LSM allows payments to be matched and offset, helping to
settle payment cycles in which each bank must receive a payment that
provides sufficient funds to allow the settlement of its own
payment. In contrast to fee-based systems, for which Martin and
McAndrews (2008a) show that introducing an LSM can lead to lower
welfare, in our model welfare is always higher with an LSM in a
collateral-based system. |
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